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A B S T R A C T
The Tribunal in Perenco v Ecuador utilized a variety of tools to craft solutions to the
complex issues that arose in this milestone case. These ranged from provisional meas-
ures and counterclaims to independent experts and environmental compensation, as
well as the adjustment of damages to avoid double recovery and contemplating an en-
vironmental remediation fund. This contribution zooms in on each of these aspects,
placing them in their broader context and appraising how the Tribunal navigated the
often-uncharted territory it was faced with, particularly from the perspective of the
multifarious legitimacy concerns that are frequently levelled at investor-state dispute
settlement. Views differ as to whether the Tribunal in this dispute was overly activist
or prudently dealt with the unique matters at stake. In a case about black gold,
Perenco v Ecuador suggests arbitral tribunals may be willing and able to engage with
shades of green.
1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N
Perenco v Ecuador is a ground-breaking case in investor–state dispute settlement. It
was long, complex and intertwined with another case known as Burlington Resources v
Ecuador. Indeed, Perenco involved seven hearings, 55 witness statements and 53 ex-
pert reports over 11 years.1 The case had many twists and turns, not least because
the Parties failed to agree on so many procedural matters. However, it is also note-
worthy for the wide variety of innovative tools utilized by the Parties and the
Tribunal to navigate through the multifarious issues at stake.
First, the Tribunal ordered provisional measures to stop Ecuador from pursuing
local proceedings against Perenco. Secondly, the Tribunal appointed its own inde-
pendent expert, in addition to the Party-appointed experts, to assess damages associ-
ated with the environmental counterclaim submitted by Ecuador. Thirdly, Perenco v
Ecuador is one of the very few cases in which environmental compensation has been
awarded, and in this instance by virtue of a counterclaim. Fourthly, given the inter-
twined subject-matter of the case with that in Burlington Resources v Ecuador, the
Tribunal in Perenco discounted the amount of compensation awarded in the former
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case to avoid double recovery. Fifthly, it considered whether it could order Ecuador
to invest the compensation awarded from the counterclaim in an environmental re-
mediation fund.
Following an overview of the background, proceedings and award, this article
zooms in on these particularly innovative dimensions of the case. It does so while
putting those aspects in their context and identifying several emerging trends in in-
vestor–state dispute settlement.
2 . B A C K G R O U N D
Perenco is an oil and gas company that was the majority shareholder and operator of
two oil exploration blocks (Blocks 7 and 21) in Ecuador’s Amazon rainforest. It had
entered into production sharing contracts (PSCs) with Ecuador’s national oil com-
pany, known as Petroecuador, and several other foreign investors, including its con-
sortium partner Burlington Resources. Under the PSCs, Perenco was to receive a
share in the revenue from the oil produced and, in the 2000s, international oil prices
started to increase significantly.
Subsequently, Ecuador enacted a law and then a decree that had the effect of
imposing a 99% windfall profit tax on certain oil revenues (Law No. 42 and Decree
662, respectively), which applied to Perenco. The PSCs had defined the tax regime
applicable to Perenco but the new law and decree subsequently raised taxes on oil
companies because of the ‘unforeseen’ rise in oil prices, in excess of the price level
that was anticipated at the time of the conclusion of the PSCs.
Perenco initially paid the additional tax but later stopped paying it to the
Government. As it did so, it sought to renegotiate its contractual relationship
with state-owned Petroecuador. However, the President of Ecuador later
announced that all PSCs would be terminated and new contracts would be
agreed. Petroecuador eventually took over the operation of the blocks itself and
the Government commenced local proceedings against Perenco to collect the tax
allegedly owed.
Perenco filed for arbitration at the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) on 30 April 2008, claiming breaches of the fair and
equitable treatment (FET) standard as well as unlawful expropriation under the
1994 France–Ecuador bilateral investment treaty (BIT). In December 2011, Ecuador
filed an environmental counterclaim as well as an infrastructure counterclaim, alleg-
ing Perenco had polluted the local environment and caused damage to the oil explor-
ation infrastructure.
3 . T H E P R O C E E D I N G S
The first of many dramatic plot twists in the story of this case came at the very begin-
ning. The Tribunal was initially comprised of Lord Thomas Bingham, presiding,
alongside Judge Charles Brower, appointed by Claimants, and Christopher Thomas
QC, appointed by the Respondent. However, following an interview he gave in a
professional journal, the Respondent challenged the independence and impartiality
of Judge Brower and made a request for his disqualification. In a decision on 8
December 2009, the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
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sustained the challenge against Judge Brower and he resigned.2 The Tribunal was
subsequently reconstituted after the resignation of Judge Brower (as well as Lord
Bingham) with Neil Kaplan QC, appointed by Claimants, and Christopher Thomas
QC remaining the arbitrator appointed by the Respondent, while Judge Peter
Tomka was designated to sit as President by the Chairman of the ICSID
Administrative Council following the Parties’ failure to agree upon this.3
In May 2009, the Tribunal recommended provisional measures to restrain the
Respondent from pursuing certain action against the Claimant at the domestic level.
The Tribunal issued its Decision on Jurisdiction in 2011, finding that Perenco was
indirectly owned by French citizens albeit that Perenco was technically a Bahamian
company,4 while on 12 September 2014 the Tribunal issued a Decision on
Remaining Issues of Jurisdiction and on Liability. In the latter, the Tribunal was of
the opinion that Ecuador was liable for breaches of the PSCs, as well as for acting in
violation of the FET standard and illegally expropriating Perenco’s investment by vir-
tue of terminating its contract.5 Thus, the windfall tax amounted to a breach of FET
but not to expropriation.
In 2015, the Tribunal issued an Interim Decision on the Environmental
Counterclaim. Although it opined that Perenco would likely be liable for environ-
mental damage in its final award, the Tribunal was at that time of the view that the
parties should settle the counterclaim, urging them to embark upon ‘a mediation pro-
cess or some other consensual procedure to assist in arriving at a mutually acceptable
figure’.6 However, the parties were not able to reach such a settlement and, as such,
on 27 September 2019 the Tribunal issued its Final Award.7 In this Award, the
Tribunal decided on the damages that were to be apportioned in the case, both in re-
spect of the principal claim and the counterclaim.
4 . T H E A W A R D
While the principal claim amounted to $1.5 billion and the environmental counter-
claim to $2.5 billion, the Tribunal ultimately awarded $449 million to Perenco for
the principal claim and $54 million to Ecuador for its counterclaim.8 As for the prin-
cipal claim, the Perenco Tribunal noted that valuing damages was ‘not an exact sci-
ence’.9 It adopted a so-called ‘layering analysis’ and opined that it should first value
the FET breach, which had occurred prior to and until the date of the expropriation,
2 In the Matter of a Challenge to be Decided by the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration Pursuant to an Agreement Concluded on October 2, 2008 in ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6
(Perenco Ecuador Ltd v Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador)),
Decision on Challenge to Arbitrator, Case No IR-2009/1 (8 December 2009).
3 Perenco Ecuador Ltd v Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador), ICSID
Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Jurisdiction (30 June 2011), [34].
4 ibid.
5 Perenco Ecuador Ltd v Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador), ICSID
Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Remaining Issues of Jurisdiction and on Liability (12 September
2014).
6 Perenco Ecuador Ltd v Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador), ICSID
Case No. ARB/08/6, Interim Decision on the Environmental Counterclaim (11 August 2015), [593].
7 Perenco Ecuador Ltd (n 1).
8 ibid.
9 ibid, [69].
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and then value the expropriation separately.10 As such, the Tribunal did not calculate
the damages by having recourse to a single valuation date, but rather calculated the
damages for the different breaches at different points in time. This meant the
Claimant had to prove the damages caused at the time of each breach.
In arriving at its award on the principal claim, the Perenco Tribunal observed that
the applicable law was inferred by the PSCs and, as such, it applied Ecuadorian law.
However, the Tribunal was careful to delimit its analysis to the alleged breach of the
PSCs arising from Law No. 42’s impact on Perenco rather than appraising the consti-
tutionality or legality of Law No. 42 per se.11 As for the environmental counterclaim,
the Tribunal also had recourse to Ecuadorian law. In this context, the 2008
Constitution of Ecuador, which provided for ‘the protection of the environment as a
fundamental constitutional imperative’ as well as rights of nature, the principles of
prevention and precaution, the human right to a healthy environment, a broad defin-
ition of environmental harm and strict liability for environmental damage,12 was par-
ticularly significant. Other domestic environmental legislation as well as
commitments made under the PSCs by Perenco were similarly considered by the
Tribunal.13
Interestingly, in the principal claim Perenco had argued that it expected its partici-
pation contract to be extended but Ecuador denied this, contending that an exten-
sion of its contract had not been likely. The Tribunal agreed with Perenco given the
subsequent practice on contract extensions in this context in Ecuador. That said,
while the lost opportunity to agree an extension was compensable according to the
Tribunal, it also said that estimating the value of this lost opportunity would be ‘an
exercise of discretion’ and, as such, decided to award Perenco a nominal amount.14
This nominal amount was $25 million.
In the context of the environmental counterclaim, Ecuador argued that the investor
caused environmental damage by polluting parts of the Amazon rainforest. It submit-
ted that it should be awarded compensation to repair the damage. Recognizing the dif-
ficulty in appraising the value of such damage and criticizing the testimony of the
Parties’ experts, the Tribunal appointed its own independent environmental expert to
assist with the task.15 In its Final Award the Tribunal, drawing on the evidence of the
Independent Expert, valued the amount of compensation due to Ecuador to repair the
environmental damage. Adjusting the final amount awarded to avoid double recovery
following the successful environmental counterclaim in the Burlington Resources v
Ecuador case, the Perenco Tribunal subtracted the $39 million that Ecuador had
received in the Burlington award from the $93 million that it found Perenco was liable
to pay for remediation in this case to arrive at the figure of $54 million.16 The Tribunal
ordered Perenco to pay this to Ecuador for its environmental counterclaim.
10 ibid, [85].
11 Perenco Ecuador Ltd (n 5) [318]–[323].
12 Perenco Ecuador Ltd (n 6) [70].
13 See, in particular, ibid, [79]–[114].
14 Perenco Ecuador Ltd (n 1) [324]–[326].
15 Perenco Ecuador Ltd (n 6) [587].
16 Perenco Ecuador Ltd (n 1) [894]–[899].
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As for the infrastructure counterclaim that Ecuador had also made against
Perenco for damage caused to the oil exploration blocks, the Tribunal was of the
view that this counterclaim had already been awarded in the Burlington case for an
amount of $2.5 million. As such, the Tribunal denied Perenco’s counterclaim on this
matter to avoid double recovery.
As is becoming evident, Perenco involved several innovative aspects. In the
remaining sections of this article, we home in on these dimensions of the case and
place them in their broader context. The first of these is the provisional measures
recommended by the Tribunal, to which we turn next.
5 . P R O V I S I O N A L M E A S U R E S
Perenco requested provisional measures to preserve the contract it had entered into
with Ecuador, as well as to prevent Ecuador from collecting on payments due under
the windfall tax at the centre of the dispute. While the Tribunal cautioned against
specific performance that might disproportionately interfere with state sovereignty,17
in its Decision on Provisional Measures the Tribunal went on to request that the
Respondent pay Perenco any amounts that it was allegedly due under Law No. 42,
restrain the Respondent from pursuing action against Perenco concerning the collec-
tion of money through its courts or otherwise, and ordered that Ecuador refrain
from unilaterally amending, rescinding, terminating or repudiating the PSCs.18
Under various arbitral rules, a tribunal may recommend provisional measures in
order to preserve either of the parties’ rights during a proceeding.19 Similarly, a party
may request provisional measures once proceedings have commenced.20 In this con-
text, the requesting party should usually specify which of its rights ought to be pre-
served, which provisional measures it requests and what circumstances it claims
warrant such measures, as well as whether the tribunal has prima facie jurisdiction.21
It should also be noted that provisional measures can be extended, changed or
revoked during the course of the proceedings.22 Those rights most typically
preserved through provisional measures in ICSID arbitration include preserving the
17 See also Occidental v Ecuador in which the Tribunal stated that, ‘[t]o impose on a sovereign State re-
instatement of a foreign investor in its concession, after a nationalization or termination of a concession
license or contract by the State, would constitute a reparation disproportional to its interference with the
sovereignty of the State when compared to monetary compensation’. Occidental Petroleum Corporation
and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11,
Decision on Provisional Measures (17 August 2007), [84].
18 Perenco Ecuador Ltd v Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador), ICSID
Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Provisional Measures (8 May 2009), [70]–[79].
19 See, eg Article 47 of the Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between States and nation-
als of other States 1965 (575 UNTS 159) (ICSID Convention), which provides that ‘[e]xcept as the par-
ties otherwise agree, the Tribunal may, if it considers that the circumstances so require, recommend any
provisional measures which should be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party’. It is supple-
mented by Rule 39 of the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (ICSID Arbitration
Rules) 2006; see also G Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd ed, Kluwer Law International
2014), 2425.
20 See, eg ICSID Arbitration Rule 39(5).
21 See, eg ICSID Arbitration Rule 39(1).
22 See, eg ICSID Arbitration Rule 39(4).






/jids/article/11/3/485/5911825 by guest on 15 O
ctober 2020
status quo and the non-aggravation of the dispute, as well as ensuring the exclusivity
and integrity of the proceedings.23
The Tribunal in Perenco v Ecuador observed that provisional measures must be
necessary and urgent.24 This broadly resonates with the practice of international
courts and tribunals. In general, in the event it receives such a request, a tribunal will
consider if such provisional measures are necessary, urgent and required to circum-
vent irreparable damage.25 First, necessity requires an appraisal of whether the provi-
sional measures are proportionate to the harm or damage they seek to avert.26
Indeed, as was noted in Burimi v. Albania, a tribunal must ‘weigh the interests of
both parties and order the measure only if the harm spared [by] the petitioner
“exceeds greatly the damage caused to the party affected” by it’.27
Secondly, urgency is a criterion that is satisfied when an issue cannot wait until
the final award of a tribunal, and is a standard which has been elaborated in the con-
texts of both investment law and public international law.28 It should also be high-
lighted that, while they are intended to respond to urgent situations, in practice
provisional measures are adjudicated between two and four months following the fil-
ing of a request for provisional measures.29
Thirdly, the approach to irreparability was considered by the Tribunal in
Burlington Resources v Ecuador, which opined that ‘harm not adequately reparable by
an award of damages’ should be the test.30 In Burlington, it was argued that the harm
alleged to have been caused could be repaired by monetary compensation. The
23 A Sinclair and O Repousis, ‘An Overview of Provisional Measures in ICSID Proceedings’ [2017] 32(2)
ICSID Review 431, 440.
24 Perenco Ecuador Ltd (n 18)[43].
25 See, eg Millicom International Operations BV and Sentel GSM SA v Republic of Senegal, ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/20, Decision on Provisional Measures (9 December 2009), [39]; Tokios Tokelés v Ukraine,
ARB/02/18, Procedural Order No 3 (18 January 2005), [8]; Railroad Development Corporation v Republic
of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, Decision on Provisional Measures (15 October 2008), [34];
Burlington Resources Inc v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Procedural Order No 1 (29
June 2009), [51]; Quiborax S.A., Non Metallic Minerals S.A. and Allan Fosk Kaplún v Plurinational State of
Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Decision on Provisional Measures (26 February 202), [113];
Abaclat and others (Case Formerly Known as Giovanna a Beccara and others) v Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/07/5, Procedural Order No 11 (27 June 2012), [11].
26 CEMEX Caracas Investments BV and CEMEX Caracas II Investments BV v. Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/15, Claimant’s Request for Provisional Measures (3 March 2010),
[42].
27 Burimi SRL and Eagle Games SHA v Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/18, Procedural Order
No. 2 (3 May 2012), [35].
28 See, eg Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/22,
Procedural Order No. 1 (31 March 2006), [76]; Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v Denmark),
Provisional Measures, Order (29 July 1991), [1991] ICJ Rep 41, [23]; Certain Criminal Proceedings in
France (Republic of the Congo v France), Provisional Measures, Order (17 June 2003), [2003] ICJ Rep
102, [22]; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), Preliminary Objections, Order (23
January 2007), [207] ICJ Rep 3, [32].
29 S Luttrell, ‘ICSID Provisional Measures “in the Round”’ [2015] 31 Arbitration International 393, 396; L
Malintoppi, ‘Provisional Measures in Recent ICSID Proceedings: What Parties Request and What
Tribunals Order’ in C Binder and others (eds), International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in
Honour of Christoph Schreuer (OUP 2009) 182–84.
30 Burlington Resources Inc v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Procedural Order No 1 (29
June 2009), [82]; see also Plama Consortium Limited v Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24,
Order (6 September 2005), [46]. For a detailed exploration of this aspect, see C Frutos-Peterson and D
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Burlington Tribunal ultimately found, however, that there was a risk of the ‘destruc-
tion of an ongoing investment and of its revenue-producing potential’ and of the
Claimant having to cease its operations entirely.31 As such, that Tribunal recom-
mended provisional measures, which involved both parties opening and paying into
an escrow account, refraining from aggravating the dispute and requesting that the
Respondent discontinue domestic proceedings against the Claimant.32
Finally, tribunals have indicated that the power to recommend provisional meas-
ures is equivalent to that of ordering them. As the Tribunal in Maffezini v Spain
explained, ‘the Tribunal’s authority to rule on provisional measures is no less binding
than that of the final award’.33 Confirming the nature of provisional measures and
making a comparison between the ICSID Convention and the ICJ Statute on provi-
sional measures, the Perenco Tribunal said ‘[t]he parallels between “recommend” in
the ICSID Convention and “indicate” in the ICJ Statute are quite clear, suggesting
that one cannot rightly assume that a “request” is comparatively weaker than a
“recommendation”, or that neither is binding’.34 While it has been argued by some
scholars that this approach taken by tribunals represents a departure from what the
parties to the ICSID Convention intended, most ICSID members have in fact
accepted the evolution.35 Despite this, several parties involved in various disputes
have declined to recognize that they are bound by provisional measures.36 This was
the case in Perenco v Ecuador when, following the recommendation of provisional
measures, Ecuador sought to auction barrels of oil that it had confiscated from
Perenco.37 Moreover, this was not the first time that Ecuador has defied provisional
measures issued by an arbitral tribunal.38
6 . E N V I R O N M E N T A L C O U N T E R C L A I M
A counterclaim is a procedural mechanism that allows a respondent to bring a claim
against the claimant. They have a relatively long history in the practice of
Ziyaeva, ‘Provisional Measures in ICSID Arbitration: The Irreparable Harm Requirement’ in D Ziyaeva
(ed), Interim Relief in International Arbitration (Juris 2015) 220–21.
31 Burlington Resources Inc v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Procedural Order No 1 (29
June 2009), [83].
32 ibid 28–29.
33 Emilio Agustı́n Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Procedural Order No 2 (28
October 1999), [9]. See also, Victor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v Republic of Chile,
ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2, Decision on Provisional Measures (25 September 2001), [2], [18]–[19],
[20]–[26]; CEMEX Caracas Investments BV and CEMEX Caracas II Investments BV v Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela, ICSID Case No ARB/08/15, Decision on Claimant’s Request for Provisional Measures (3
March 2010), [39]–[40].
34 Perenco Ecuador Ltd (n 18)[69].
35 T Gazzini and R Kolb, ‘Provisional Measures in ICSID Arbitration from “Wonderland’s Jurisprudence” to
Informal Modification of Treaties’ [2017] 16 The Law and Practice of International Courts and
Tribunals 159, 183.
36 See, eg Ceskoslovenská Obchodnı́ Banka, A.S. v The Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/97/4,
Procedural Order No. 4 (11 January 1999); Procedural Order No. 5 (1 March 2000); Plama Consortium
Limited v Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Order (6 September 2005), [43].
37 D Vis-Dunbar, ‘Ecuador Defies Provisional Measures in Dispute with French Oil Company’ (Investment
Treaty News, 5 June 2009) <https://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/06/05/ecuador-defies-provisional-measures-
in-dispute-with-french-oil-company/> accessed 7 August 2020.
38 See, eg City Oriente Limited v Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador
(Petroecuador), ICSID Case No. ARB/06/21.






/jids/article/11/3/485/5911825 by guest on 15 O
ctober 2020
international courts and tribunals.39 The ICJ has defined a counterclaim as ‘inde-
pendent of the principal claim in so far as it constitutes a separate “claim”, that is to
say an autonomous legal act the object of which is to submit a new claim to the
Court, and, . . . at the same time, it is linked to the principal claim, in so far as, for-
mulated as a “counter” claim, it reacts to it’.40 Counterclaims have arisen in a number
of investor–state dispute settlement cases as well.41 That said, most of these have
been rejected, usually for jurisdictional or admissibility reasons.42
In Perenco v Ecuador, Ecuador argued through a counterclaim that the Claimant
had caused environmental damage in polluting parts of the Amazon rainforest.43 The
counterclaim was based on a violation of Ecuadorian domestic law that concerned
environmental protection. The Tribunal found that it had jurisdiction over the coun-
terclaim and that it was admissible.44 During the proceedings, the Tribunal received
two requests from Perenco that the counterclaim be dismissed. One of these con-
cerned Perenco’s argument that, given an award on the environmental counterclaim
had been rendered in Burlington Resources v Ecuador, the dispute at issue in the pre-
sent counterclaim was res judicata, which the Tribunal ultimately dismissed because
it appraised there was a possibility the Burlington Award could be annulled and, in
any event, the Perenco Tribunal could eliminate the risk of double recovery.45
In its consideration of the counterclaim, the Tribunal reviewed all of the evidence
put forward by the parties and the Tribunal-appointed expert, and was of the view
that Perenco would likely be liable for causing environmental damage in its Final
Award, at which point it would also indicate its findings as to the value of the dam-
age.46 We will assess the valuation methodology and amount of environmental com-
pensation actually awarded below.
Counterclaims for environmental damage caused by foreign investors have arisen
in several recent cases. One of the first examples in fact arose in Burlington Resources
v Ecuador. In this case, the Tribunal awarded compensation for environmental
39 See, eg Factory at Chorzów (Germany/Poland), Judgment, [1928] PCIJ Rep Series A, No 17, 34–39, 63–
64; Judgment [1937] PCIJ Rep Series A/B, No 70, 28–32; Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case, Judgment
[1950] ICJ Rep 266, 278.
40 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Counter-claims,
Order of 17 December 1997, [1997] ICJ Rep 243, [27].
41 See, eg Spyridon Roussalis v Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/06/1, Award (7 December 2011), [859];
Antoine Goetz & others and SA Affinage des métaux v Republic of Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/2,
Award (21 June 2012), [267]; Hesham Talaat M Al-Warraq v Republic of Indonesia, UNCITRAL (15
December 2014), [659]; Vestey Group Limited v Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/4, Award (15 April
2016), [333]; Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v The
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award (8 December 2016); Burlington Resources Inc v
Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Counterclaims (7 February 2017).
42 AK Hoffmann, ‘Counterclaims’ in M Kinnear and others (eds), Building International Investment Law: The
First 50 Years of ICSID (Wolters Kluwer 2016) 505.
43 Perenco Ecuador Ltd v Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Eduador (Petroecuador),
ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Interim Decision on the Environmental Counterclaim (11 August 2015).
44 Perenco Ecuador Ltd v Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Eduador (Petroecuador),
ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Perenco’s Application for Dismissal of Ecuador’s
Counterclaims (18 August 2017), [43], [44] and [51].
45 ibid, [50] and [52].
46 Perenco Ecuador Ltd v Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Eduador (Petroecuador),
ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Interim Decision on the Environmental Counterclaim (11 August 2015).
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damage caused by the Claimant, following a counterclaim submitted by Ecuador.47
As in Perenco, the Tribunal in Burlington Resources made its finding on the basis of
Ecuadorian domestic environmental law.
In David Aven et al v Costa Rica, a tribunal found that the Claimants had breached
environmental law in Costa Rica and that Costa Rica was justified in interfering with
a tourism project investment on the grounds of environmental protection.48 Costa
Rica also submitted a counterclaim against the Claimants for breaching provisions
on environmental protection under the relevant international investment agreement
in the course of the proceedings. In this context, Costa Rica asked the Tribunal to
order that Claimants pay compensation to Costa Rica for repairing the environmen-
tal damage caused by Claimants’ activities.49 While it was apparently sympathetic to
the environmental concerns in this case, the Tribunal rejected the counterclaim for
procedural reasons.50 In particular, Costa Rica had not properly presented its claim
for environmental damage in a timely manner.51
Counterclaims have also been made in connection with issues other than environ-
mental damage, such as in relation to human rights. Urbaser v Argentina52 was the
first investment tribunal to accept jurisdiction over a counterclaim on human rights.
It is also interesting as it does not involve a counterclaim based in domestic law, as
was the case in Perenco and Burlington Resources, but rather on international law. The
latter scenario is more complicated in the context of investor–state dispute settle-
ment, not least because private actors like investors have not classically been subject
to international legal obligations in the same way that they can be subject to domes-
tic legal obligations.53
Urbaser v Argentina concerned a concession for water distribution and sewage in
Buenos Aires. Argentina counterclaimed that Urbaser had breached its obligations
under the concession contract as it did not adequately invest in the water distribution
infrastructure and it was not possible to guarantee the right to water to the popula-
tion in the areas concerned. The Tribunal in Urbaser rejected the argument that it
could not accept jurisdiction for a human rights claim,54 and was of the view that the
BIT at issue did not constitute a ‘closed system’,55 which meant the state was entitled
to invoke legal obligations beyond the treaty. The Tribunal also rejected the argu-
ment that the Claimant, being a non-state entity, could not be bound by human
rights obligations. Indeed, it emphasized that human rights and labour standards
47 Burlington Resources Inc v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Counterclaims (7
February 2017).




52 Urbaser SA and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award (8 December 2016).
53 A de Nanteuil, ‘Counterclaims in Investment Arbitration: Old Questions, New Answers’ [2018] 17(2)
The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 374.
54 Urbaser SA (n 52)[1154].
55 ibid, [1191].
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were applicable to public and private actors.56 That said, the Tribunal went on to dis-
tinguish that the human rights at issue in this case entailed ‘an obligation of compli-
ance on the part of the state, but [not] an obligation for performance on the part of
any company providing a contractually required service’.57 Therefore, unless there is
domestic provision for such international obligations, Urbaser suggests it may be dif-
ficult to subject private entities to these in investor-state dispute settlement.
7 . E N V I R O N M E N T A L C O M P E N S A T I O N
In the context of the counterclaim in Perenco v Ecuador, Ecuador argued that the in-
vestor caused environmental damage by polluting parts of the Amazon rainforest and
submitted that it should be paid around $2.5 billion in compensation to repair the
damage. In its Final Award, the Tribunal indicated the damages awarded to both
Parties, including that monetary compensation should be paid to Ecuador for the en-
vironmental damage caused by the Claimants.58
In its reasoning on the environmental counterclaim, the Tribunal noted that ‘[p]roper
environmental stewardship has assumed great importance in today’s world’ and that, if
the relevant BIT permits it, the state may make a counterclaim for environmental damage
caused by the investor and, if a tribunal is satisfied that the counterclaim is substantiated,
the state should be awarded full reparation.59 The Tribunal was of the view that ‘a State
has wide latitude under international law to prescribe and adjust its environmental laws,
standards and policies in response to changing views and a deeper understanding of the
risks posed by various activities, including those of extractive industries such as oilfields’.60
Moreover, the Tribunal explained that the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development of 1992 had been an important source in drafting the relevant Ecuadorian
law on the protection of the environment that Perenco had allegedly breached.61
In its Interim Decision, the Tribunal engaged in an analysis of Ecuadorian envir-
onmental law and, in particular, whether a strict or fault-based liability applied. This
is an analysis that the Tribunal in Burlington Resources v Ecuador had also con-
ducted.62 Interestingly, the Perenco and Burlington tribunals diverged on their inter-
pretation of whether the applicable Ecuadorian environmental law at certain times of
the investor’s activity provided for a fault-based or strict liability regime for environ-
mental harm. The Burlington Tribunal said:
56 ibid, [1198], [1200]–[1203]. For an insightful analysis of the Tribunal’s reasoning on this point, see E de
Brabandere, ‘Human Rights and Foreign Direct Investment’ in M Krajewski and R Hoffmann (eds),
Research Handbook on Foreign Direct Investment (Edward Elgar 2018).
57 Urbaser SA (n 52)[1208].
58 Perenco Ecuador Ltd (n 1).
59 Perenco Ecuador Ltd (n 6)[34].
60 ibid, [34]–[35].
61 ibid, [331].
62 Burlington Resources Inc (n 47). Interestingly, the Tribunal applied Ecuadorian environmental law because
it was the law of the host state under art 42(2) of the ICSID Convention, and not because it had been
chosen by the Parties under art 42(1) of the ICSID Convention. As it has been pointed out, the applica-
tion of art 42(2) is significant because it allows the tribunal freedom to apply either domestic or inter-
national law. See Stefanie Schacherer, International Investment Law and Sustainable Development: Key
Cases from the 2010s (IISD 2018) 23.
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it has difficulty following the Perenco Tribunal’s view that decisions of the
Ecuadorian courts have merely “strengthened the presumptions in favour of a
finding of liability in the case of damage caused through hazardous activities”
[and] finds indeed that these courts have established a strict liability regime for
hazardous activities, in particular oilfield operations.63
Conceived as a strict liability regime, Ecuadorian environmental law merely
required proof that an economic activity entailing a serious risk to the environment
took place in the concerned area as well as an actual negative impact on the environ-
ment.64 However, as a fault-based liability regime, there was a rebuttable presump-
tion that operators engaging in risky activities would be responsible for damage that
resulted from this.65 The Perenco Tribunal added that where negligence or regulatory
exceedance had taken place, the operator should be deemed to have caused the en-
vironmental tort,66 unless it could prove—on a preponderance of evidence—force
majeure, that it in fact discharged the relevant duty of care or the harm was caused by
another actor.67
As for the environmental compensation awarded in the Burlington case, that
Tribunal ordered the payment of $41 million.68 In its valuation of the environmental
damage, the Burlington Tribunal assessed the harm caused and reparation cost at
each of the 40 sites in the oilfield exploited by the Claimant and even made site visits
to assess soil contamination and land use in the area,69 which was not something
that the Perenco Tribunal did. At each of the sites, the Parties’ counsel in the
Burlington case were permitted to make oral presentations as well as to answer any
questions that the Tribunal had.
It is interesting to note the evolution in the reasoning of investment tribunals
over recent years concerning environmental matters. Indeed, environmental consid-
erations have become much more integrated in the reasoning of tribunals as they ar-
rive at their decisions, rather than as an additional element mentioned in obiter
dicta.70 Perenco v Ecuador follows this mainstreaming of environmental considera-
tions in the jurisprudence of investment tribunals, a trend that is evident, for ex-
ample, in Unglaube v Costa Rica,71 Gold Reserve v Venezuela72 and Clayton and Bilcon
v Canada.73 Similarly, Perenco v Ecuador reflects cases like Al Tamimi v Oman74 and
63 ibid, [248].
64 ibid, [82] and [225ff].
65 Perenco Ecuador Ltd (n 6) [371].
66 ibid, [374].
67 ibid, [379].
68 Burlington Resources Inc (n 47).
69 ibid, [18ff].
70 JE Vinuales, ‘Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law: Current Trends’ in K Miles
(ed), Research Handbook on Environment and Investment Law (Edward Elgar 2019) 35.
71 Marion Unglaube v Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No ARB/08/1, Award (16 May 2012).
72 Gold Reserve Inc v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/09/1, Award (22
September 2014).
73 Bilcon of Delaware et al v Government of Canada, PCA Case No 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and
Liability (17 March 2015).
74 Adel A Hamadi Al Tamimi v Sultanate of Oman, ICSID Case No ARB/11/33, Award (3 November
2015).
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Aaron C Berkowitz, Brett E. Berkowitz and Trevor B. Berkowitz (formerly Spence
International Investments) v Costa Rica,75 which have afforded policy space to coun-
tries so that they can take measures intended to protect the environment.
Outside the investor–state dispute settlement context, it is important to mention
the decision of the ICJ on environmental compensation in the Certain Activities
Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua)
(Compensation) case of 2018.76 The Court made a significant point of principle:
namely, that ‘damage to the environment, and the consequent impairment or loss of
the ability of the environment to provide goods and services, is compensable under
international law’. In the case, Costa-Rica estimated that environmental damages
amounted to approximately $6 million. It used a so-called ‘ecosystem services ap-
proach’ to arrive at this valuation. Such ecosystem services may include provisioning
services provided by the environment (like food, wood, fuel, or medicines), regulat-
ing services (like biological diversity, climate regulation, human disease control, flood
and storm protection, and waste treatment), as well as cultural services. Nicaragua,
on the other hand, arrived at an amount of about $190,000 using what it termed a
‘replacement costs approach’. Under this approach, the cost of preserving an equiva-
lent area while the affected area recovers, as well as certain remediation costs, com-
prise the elements used to calculate the compensation owed.
The ICJ ultimately awarded an amount of approximately $380,000. It decided to
value the environmental damage based on what it called an ‘overall valuation ap-
proach’. Using this approach, compensation for environmental damage is calculated
based on an overall evaluation of the impairment or loss of environmental goods and
services, rather than by calculating the value of specific categories of environmental
goods and services as well as the time it may take each to recover. Moreover, the
Court distinguished the valuation for pure environmental damage from the expenses
incurred by a state as a result of such damage, which can also be compensable and in-
clude such costs as monitoring the affecting area, for example.
These cases bring into sharp focus that environmental concerns can be taken into
account by international courts and tribunals, and may even become critical to deter-
mining the outcome of a dispute. That said, the recent jurisprudence also highlights
that there are many ways of calculating monetary compensation for environmental
damage and their outcomes vary significantly.77 Tribunals in the future will have to
navigate through the thicket of approaches that have been developed in recent practice,
and the best practice indicates that experts may play a critical role in assisting tribunals.
8 . T R I B U N A L - A P P O I N T E D I N D E P E N D E N T E X P E R T
In Perenco v Ecuador, the Tribunal acknowledged the difficulty in evaluating environ-
mental damage and compensation on the basis of expert reports provided by the
75 Aaron C Berkowitz, Brett E Berkowitz and Trevor B Berkowitz (formerly Spence International Investments
et al.) v Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No UNCT/13/2, Interim Award of the Tribunal on
Jurisdiction (25 October 2016).
76 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), Compensation,
Judgment [2018] ICJ Rep 15.
77 For a detailed exploration of environmental compensation in international law, see J Rudall,
Compensation for Environmental Damage Under International Law (Routledge 2020).
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parties. The Tribunal in fact complained that the parties were ‘effectively shooting at
different targets’ in their assessments and this made the Tribunal’s task very diffi-
cult.78 It even observed that the Party-appointed experts had ‘crossed the boundary
between professional objective analysis and party representation’ and were ‘each
attempting to achieve the best result for the party by whom they were instructed’.79
As a result, the Tribunal needed additional expert evidence to appraise the environ-
mental damage and went on to appoint its own independent environmental expert.80
In its Interim Decision, although the Tribunal suggested that Perenco would likely
be held liable for environmental damage, it declined to decide the specific aspects of
the counterclaim and indicated that the Tribunal’s expert would assist in valuing the
damage prior to the Final Award being published. While the appearance of both
party- and tribunal-appointed experts is not alien to international arbitration, the ex-
istence of accompanying procedural safeguards has been lacking.81 Perenco goes
some way to remedying this.
The expert was chosen after consultation with the Parties. In fact, each of the
Parties were given an opportunity to interview the Independent Expert. Both recom-
mended that the Tribunal appoint Mr Scott MacDonald as its Independent Expert,
and he was duly appointed by the Tribunal.82 A protocol was drawn up for the expert
by the Tribunal and the Tribunal made it clear that the expert was only answerable
to the Tribunal. That said, safeguards were constructed at various points in the pro-
ceedings to ensure transparency, fairness and Party participation as the Independent
Expert went about his work. Importantly, the Tribunal allowed the Parties to attend
the investigations of the Independent Expert’s team, receive a copy of the
Independent Expert’s findings and to comment on the Independent Expert’s final re-
port.83 It should also be noted that his investigation was limited to the sites where
one or both Parties had identified soil, groundwater or mud pit contamination.84
Moreover, the mandate of the Independent Expert was circumscribed to supple-
menting the evidence obtained by the party-appointed experts.85
The Independent Expert’s report was issued on 19 December 2018.86 The
Independent Expert, in reviewing the Parties’ expert findings, was of the view that
the ‘technical choices made by the Parties, intended or not, embedded biases within
their findings’,87 confirming the earlier concerns of the Tribunal about the reliability
of the Parties’ expert evidence.
Both Parties commented on the Independent Expert’s findings. Among their
comments, Perenco claimed that the Independent Expert had exceeded his mandate
78 Perenco Ecuador Ltd (n 6) [581].
79 ibid.
80 ibid, [587].
81 M Hodgson and M Stewart, ‘Experts in Investor-State Arbitration: The Tribunal as Gatekeeper’ [2018]
9(3) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 453, 457.
82 Perenco Ecuador Ltd (n 1) [425].
83 Perenco Ecuador Ltd (n 6) [588].
84 Perenco Ecuador Ltd (n 1) [519].
85 ibid.
86 ibid, 514.
87 Perenco Ecuador Ltd v The Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Eduador (Petroecuador),
ICSID Case No ARB/08/6, Mr Scott MacDonald’s Independent Expert Report (19 December 2019),
32–33.
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by undertaking sampling at sites that had not been sampled by the Parties’ experts,
while Ecuador claimed that the Independent Expert had exceeded his mandate by
not conducting sampling at certain sites that had been sampled by the Parties’
experts.88 Perenco’s claim was dismissed by the Tribunal while Ecuador’s was
accepted.89 Consequently, the Tribunal adjusted upwards the damages estimated by
Mr MacDonald in the amount of $7.7 million.90 Other than this significant adjust-
ment, the Tribunal largely adopted the remedial estimates provided by the
Independent Expert, which were based on remediation costs in Ecuador.
It is interesting to highlight that further safeguards were implemented for the
Parties as the Independent Expert introduced his evidence at the hearings. Indeed,
the Parties were permitted to make two sets of written pleadings, oral pleadings as
well as submit questions to the Tribunal-appointed expert during the hearings.
Further still, throughout the hearings the Party-appointed experts and counsel were
permitted to hold witness conferences with the Tribunal-appointed expert.91 The
Tribunal-appointed Independent Expert evaluated the total amount of contamin-
ation at the affected sites and indicated the cost of remediation, which amounted to
$160 million in his estimation. Taking into account that the affected sites had also
been exploited by other operators who had caused damage, the Tribunal found that
Perenco was liable for $93 million in environmental damage. However, it should be
noted that the evidence for this damage by past operators was limited and, as
explored below, the Tribunal once again was required to be creative with methodo-
logical tools it had at its disposal to apportion liability.
The kinds of safeguards adopted in Perenco help to ensure that legitimacy issues
around the use of experts are addressed.92 However, the appointment of tribunal-
appointed experts in international arbitration has only occurred in eight publicly
available investor–state cases since 2005,93 and the practice in other international
courts and tribunals has likewise been mixed. Indeed, the ICJ in the abovementioned
Costa Rica v Nicaragua (Compensation) case did not avail of a Court-appointed expert
despite that it is the first case of its kind - an award of environmental compensation -
before that jurisdiction.94 On the other hand, in the 2010 Pulp Mills on the River
Uruguay case the ICJ emphasised that scientific or technical evidence should be
submitted via experts rather than counsel, which would allow such evidence to be
88 Perenco Ecuador Ltd (n 1) [818]–[834].
89 ibid, [827] and [830].
90 ibid, [830].
91 ibid, [627]–[630].
92 M Mbengue, ‘The Role of Experts Before the International Court of Justice: The Whaling in the
Antarctic Case. Questions of International Law’ [2015] 2 Zoom-in 3; L Boisson de Chazournes and
others, ‘One Size Does Not Fit All – Uses of Experts before International Courts and Tribunals: An
Insight into the Practice’ [2018] 9(3) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 477.
93 These were cases in which damages were awarded and the tribunal-appointed experts were additional to
party-appointed experts. N Choudhury, ‘Tribunal–appointed damages experts: Procedural improvements
can serve as a better alternative in arbitration’ (Thompson Reuters, 30 April 2018), <https://uk.practical
law.thomsonreuters.com/w-014-5066?transitionType¼Default&contextData¼(sc.Default)&firstPage¼
true&bhcp¼1>.
94 See J Rudall, ‘Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)’
[2018] 112(2) American Journal of International Law 288, 293.
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subject to cross-examination.95 Scientific experts have since appeared in several other
ICJ cases.96 Beyond the ICJ, in the South China Sea Arbitration Between the Republic
of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China, the Tribunal appointed its own
ex curia experts to facilitate the Tribunal’s assessment of the environmental impact of
the activities conducted by China in the South China Sea.97
9 . A D J U S T I N G D A M A G E S
As alluded to above, Perenco had invested in a consortium with US company
Burlington Resources. In 2012, the Tribunal in Burlington Resources v Ecuador ultimately
found that Ecuador had breached the US–Ecuador BIT for unlawfully expropriating
Burlington’s investment because it had seized the production facilities being used by
Burlington Resources, but not because of the windfall tax.98 In 2017, however, it also
ordered the payment of $39 million in compensation for environmental damage caused
by the Claimant.99 Adjusting the amount awarded for environmental compensation to
avoid double recovery following the successful environmental counterclaim in the
Burlington case, the Perenco Tribunal subtracted the $39 million that Ecuador had
received in the Burlington Award from the $93 million that it found Perenco was liable
to pay for remediation in this case to arrive at the figure of $54 million.100
In its Final Award, it is also notable that the Tribunal was careful to delineate be-
tween contamination that was attributable to Perenco’s predecessors or its successors
only, contamination that was attributable to Perenco only, and contamination that
was attributable to Perenco and either its predecessors or its successors as well.101
Indeed, the Tribunal did find that some of the harm had been caused by other opera-
tors, although it recognized the difficulty in attempting to ‘unscramble the contamin-
ation egg’ and that the exercise was ‘not one of scientific certainty.102 As such, where
it was necessary to do so, the Tribunal used a time-weighted sharing technique to al-
locate liability between successive operators for soil contamination and groundwater
impairment.103 In doing so, the Tribunal adjusted the damages awarded in the case
to reflect only those that Perenco itself was liable for.
For the infrastructure counterclaim, the Tribunal observed that a higher amount
of $2.5 million had already been granted in the related Burlington case for infrastruc-
ture damages and, as a result, awarding monetary compensation for Ecuador’s
95 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), ICJ Reports 2010, p 14, para 167.
96 See, eg Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan), ICJ Reports 2014, p 226, paras 74–75; Construction
of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica), Judgment, 16 December 2015,
paras 45, 175–176, 204; Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean (Costa Rica v
Nicaragua) / Land Boundary in the Northern Part of Isla Portillos (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), General List
Nos 157 and 165, 2 February 2018, paras 14, 71, 73, and 86.
97 South China Sea Arbitration Between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China,
Award, paras. 84, 136 and 821.
98 Burlington Resources Inc. v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/08/5, Decision on Liability (14
December 2012), [545].
99 Burlington Resources Inc (n 47)[1099]. The Tribunal also ordered the payment of 2,577,119.77 for
Ecuador’s infrastructure counterclaims, [1074].
100 Perenco Ecuador Ltd (n 1) [894]–[899].
101 ibid, [882].
102 ibid, [810].
103 ibid, [811] and [887].
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infrastructure counterclaim in the Perenco case would amount to double recovery.104
As such, no compensation was awarded for damage caused to the infrastructure asso-
ciated with Blocks 7 and 21.
1 0 . A N E N V I R O N M E N T A L R E M E D I A T I O N F U N D ?
Interestingly, Perenco had argued that Ecuador should pay any compensation
awarded for the environmental counterclaim into an environmental remediation
fund.105 Ecuador agreed to this.106 However, the Tribunal declined to make such an
order.107 It considered that this ‘would require continued monitoring of Ecuador’s
remediation activities’ by the Tribunal and such monitoring ‘would be inconsistent
with the Tribunal’s role’, not least because, following the issuance of the Final
Award, ‘the Tribunal is functus officio’.108 That said, the Tribunal went on to declare
its ‘firm expectation . . . that the proceeds of the damages award made in favour of
Ecuador in the environmental counterclaim will be devoted to remediation’.109
1 1 . C O N C L U S I O N
The Tribunal in Perenco v Ecuador utilized a variety of tools in its toolbox to craft sol-
utions to the complex issues that arose in this case. These ranged from provisional
measures and counterclaims to independent experts and environmental compensa-
tion, as well as the adjustment of damages to avoid double recovery. Some have char-
acterized the tools used in these proceedings as an example of ‘tribunal activism’,110
while others observe they represent a ‘vehicle to facilitate sustainable and eco-
friendly development’.111 The tools certainly allowed shades of green to be painted
into a case about black gold, amongst other positive and negative outcomes. Given
that an application for the annulment of the Award was registered by ICSID at the
end of 2019, and a stay on its enforcement was confirmed on 21 April 2020 by the
ad hoc annulment committee, it is likely that there is yet more mileage in this mile-
stone case.
104 ibid, [996].
105 Perenco Ecuador Ltd v The Republic of Ecuador and Empresa Estatal Petróleos del Eduador (Petroecuador),
ICSID Case No ARB/08/6, Perenco’s Comments to the Independent Expert Report (22 February
2019), [75].
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